a. Proof of the First Conclusion

31. The proof of the first conclusion [n.28] is that what is per se signified by the word ‘accident’ is a certain respect as to that of which it is an accident, and perhaps it is the same respect that is introduced by the term ‘inhering’ as to what it inheres in. And the thing signified by accident and by accident-ness (so to speak) and by what inheres and inherence is the same. Therefore, just as it is impossible for there to be an accident-ness that is not an inherence (if actually, actually; if aptitudinally, apititudinally), so the fact that something is an accident (speaking of what is per se and first signified by the this word) cannot not be inherent proportionally - that is, if actually actually, if aptitudinally aptitudinally.

32. And if you ask what genus that belongs to which per se signifies what is meant by ‘accident’ and ‘inhering’, I reply that it belongs to a genus of extrinsically arising respect. For it is plain that it states a respect, because its idea cannot be understood by itself. And it does not state a respect that comes from within, because it does not state what necessarily follows the positing of the extreme terms; for, as will be plain in the final conclusion [nn.39-42], its foundation and term can persist without the respect.

33. If you ask what genus it should be reduced to, perhaps to the genus of ‘passion’ [Categories 9.11b1-14], so that in this way passion states not only the respect of the passive thing to the agent, but to the form, or possibly perhaps to the genus of ‘action’ [ibid.], so that in this way action states not only the respect of the agent to the patient, but of the informing form to that which is informed. But in either way it will be a respect coming from outside.

34. And if you object that what belongs to a determinate genus cannot belong to several genera, but the term ‘accident’ or ‘inhering’, as far as concerns the per se idea of the word, belongs to all nine genera [n.35],     therefore etc     . - I reply that it is very possible that what belongs to a determinate genus denominates several genera; for perhaps ‘created thing’ states something that per se belongs to the genus of relation, and yet perhaps it denominates anything other than God, and only what is other than God is properly in a genus. So, therefore, this respect can belong per se to one genus, and yet it is denominatively said of the relations or respects of the nine genera.

35. But if it be objected against this, from Simplicius On the Categories [section on substance], that ‘is in’ does not constitute any special genus, because there is one ‘is in’ for all nine genera - I reply that either ‘is in’ is taken denominatively, and thus it encompasses all the genera of accidents, just as does that which is ‘inheres in’ or ‘is accident to’; or it is taken for the relation that is per se signified by ‘is in’, and in this way not just any accident is taken by ‘is in’, because it is a determinate species in one genus. But if Simplicius means that ‘is in’, as far as concerns the per se idea that it introduces, does not belong to any determinate genus but per se to several genera, he is to be rejected, for he is not of so great authority that the opposite of what reason concludes is, on his say-so, to be conceded. Now reason convincingly shows that the concept that ‘in’ introduces can be contained quidditatively in some genus, even though it be denominatively said of forms that are in many genera. For it is not said quidditatively of whiteness and line, because then whiteness and line would not be said for themselves, for that which essentially includes a relation is not for itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity 7.2 n.3.